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Abstract
Group formation is important in many economic contexts. The current literature on group
formation assumes that individuals may join any existing group. In this paper, I consider
the implications of social, geographic, and informational constraints to group membership
decisions. I embed the players in a network of relationships, which constrains their choice of
groups–they may only join a group if that group contains a member that they are connected
to on the network. I then examine how this network constraint affects the equilibrium group
structure. I show that even with complete information, unconstrained individuals form
groups that are inefficiently large. When individuals are constrained, the resulting group
structures are much closer to the socially optimal group structure, because the constraint
limits the ability of the individual to free ride on the efforts of other group members. The
efficiency of the outcome is related to the structure of the network constraint–outcomes are
more efficient when networks are sparse and have few random connections.
Keywords: social network theory, game theory on a network, externalities, group
formation (C60, C73, D70, D83, D85)
Group formation is important in a variety of economic contexts: within firms, workers form
teams to combine human capital resources and aid in production; farmers form cooperatives
to pool outcomes and share risk; consumers create groups to increase buying power, and
rent-seekers form coalitions to increase their leverage. In a social context, groups are created
to organize volunteer efforts, lobby for political causes, and create social unity. In all of
these contexts, there is a benefit to the individual from being a member of the group,
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and the success of both the individual and the overall society depends on group structure.
The current literature on group formation assumes that individuals are unconstrained in
their choice of groups. In other words, any individual can join any group at any time.
However, instances where group membership decisions are truly unconstrained are rare–
individuals face a wide range of social, geographic, and informational constraints in their
group membership decisions. In this paper, I extend the existing group membership models
to account for such widespread constraints. I embed individuals in a network of relationships,
which constrains their choice of groups–an individual may only join a group which contains
one of her contacts on the network. For example, an individual might be constrained to
joining groups containing a friend or relative. I then examine how this network constraint
affects the equilibrium group structure. I show that in some cases, network constraints make
equilibrium group structures more efficient, and result in higher social welfare. I also show
that we can see hints of the underlying network structure in the structure of the groups that
form.
The literature on group formation spans a number of subfields, including industrial
organization, political economy, and public economics.2 All games in this literature have
three common elements: 1) players make decisions about group membership, 2) they can
be a member of one and only one group, 3) their payoffs depend on the arrangement of the
players into groups. In the earliest work, players make their group membership decisions
simultaneously.3 However, more recent literature has focused on dynamic group formation
games, in which players make their group formation decisions sequentially over time.4
This paper further extends this literature by considering the very real constraints that
individuals face when making group membership decisions. Consider, for example, a set
of farmers forming water management groups along the banks of a river. Although it is
conceivable that the farmers would organize into groups at random, they are more likely to
2This diversity of fields induces a diversity of terminology. Alternatives to “group formation” include
"club formation," "team assembly," and "coalition formation."
3See, for example, Hart and Kurz (1983), Nitzan (1991), Yi and Shin (2000), Konishi et al. (1997), and
Heintzelman et al. (2009).
4See Demange and Wooders (2005) and Bloch (2010) for a survey of this work. This includes, among
others, Bloch (1996), Yi and Shin (2000), Arnold and Schwalbe (2002), Konishi and Ray (2003), Arnold and
Wooders (2005), Macho-Stadler et al. (2006), and Page and Wooders (2007).
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organize with farmers who are adjacent to them on the river than those in distant locations.
Other groups are governed by social connections. For example, research lab groups are
more likely to be composed of colleagues than strangers. In some cases, social constraints
on group membership even serve a purpose by facilitating enforcement of rules and social
norms. There may also be informational constraints to group membership–an individual can
only join an organization if she knows of its existence. Covert organizations are an extreme
example of informational constraints.
A network is a natural way of representing constraints on group membership. Individu-
als are embedded in a fixed, exogenous network of relationships, which limit their access to
other groups, and an individual can only join a group if she is connected to a current member
on the network. This method allows me to use machinery from the burgeoning networks
literature, which explores how network structure affects individual behavior.5 Depending on
its structure, this network may represent any of the constraints mentioned above. Networks
representing spacial constraints will have fewer random connections than the networks rep-
resenting social constraints. The density of the network constraint will reflect how close the
ties have to be in order to allow group membership. For example, becoming a member of
a volunteer organization may only require a passing relationship with a current member,
whereas an individual joining a covert organization will likely only find acceptance if she is
extremely close to a current member. In other words, if we imagine that there is a threshold
level of familiarity that is required for group membership, that level of familiarity will dic-
tate the density of the network. A lower threshold of familiarity implies more links, which
implies a denser network.
This network structure allows us to consider whether different types of constraints create
different types of group structures. Do individuals behave differently when their group
membership decisions are moderated by spacial constraints, as opposed to social constraints?
How does equilibrium group structure change as the requirements for membership become
more stringent? In other words, can we see traces of network structure in the structure of
5See Jackson (2008) for a survey of the ways that limiting interactions between individuals can affect
strategic behavior. Girvan and Newman (2002), Newman and Girvan (2003), and Copic et al. (2009) look
at methods for finding community structure in social networks without overt group membership.
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groups?
I start with a game in which individuals are completely unconstrained in their choice of
groups. I show that when individuals are unconstrained in their group membership, they
will form groups that are much too large, from the standpoint of social welfare. This is
a somewhat surprising result, which has not yet been noted in the group formation liter-
ature. Groups become too large because of the externality that new members impose on
the group’s existing membership–new members free ride off of the efforts of early group
members, and new groups are under-provided. I then consider the effect of a network con-
straint on equilibrium group structure. I show that when individuals are constrained by
their networks, the resulting group structures are much closer to the socially optimal group
structure, and thus much more efficient. This is because the network constraint limits the
ability of the individual to free ride on the efforts of other group members. The efficiency of
the outcome is related to the structure of the network constraint–outcomes are more efficient
when networks are sparse. This suggests that group structure will be more efficient when
the constraints on group membership are more severe. Moreover, I show that holding the
density of the network constant, outcomes are more efficient in networks with fewer random
connections. This suggests a secondary effect–local constraints are more binding than social
constraints, making the resulting group structure more efficient.
1. Dynamic Group Formation Game
Let I = {1, 2, ...N} be a set of N homogeneous individuals. An individual can be a
member of one and only one group–thus, the group structure at time t is a partition of I,
pi(t) =
{
G1G2...GJ(t)
}
, where Gj denotes the set of individuals in group j.6 Note that the
number of groups is determined endogenously, and thus J(t) may vary from one period to
the next. The set of all such partitions of the players into groups is denoted Π.
The players have identical payoff functions that depend on the size of the player’s own
group: f(gj) where i ∈ Gj and gj = |Gj | is the size of group j.7 I assume that f(g) is
6Note that the set of individuals in a group is also a function of time. That is, pi (t) ={
G1 (t) , G2 (t) , ..., GJ(t) (t)
}
. However, for notational clarity, I will suppress the time-dependance.
7The assumption that payoffs depend only on own group size obviously does not allow for externalities
between groups, nor does it allow players to have preferences over group composition. However, this is
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single-peaked with maximum value g∗.8
Since individuals in this game are homogeneous, the exact arrangement of the players
in the groups is not as important as the sizes of the groups. Thus, I will often find it
convenient to refer to the vector of group sizes resulting from a particular partition of the
individuals, rather than referring to the partition itself: define the group size vector of a
partition pi(t) = {G1...GJ} by 〈g1...gJ〉.
Players move sequentially in an order of motion, φ. At time t, the active player can
choose to either join an existing group, Gj ∈ pi(t), or strike out on her own, forming a group
of size 1. Thus, individual i’s action set at time t can be denoted by Ai(t) = pi(t)∪∅, where
∅ denotes the action of striking out as an individual. Thus, (N, f(g), φ) defines a dynamic
group formation game.
I will assume that players make their group membership decisions myopically–that is,
they decide which group will maximize their return, given only the current group structure.
This defines a behavior strategy, β (.), which maps the current group partition, pi(t), to the
individual’s action set: β (pi(t)) ∈ Ai(t). This myopic behavior strategy is similar to that
used in the sequential group formation literature, including Arnold and Schwalbe (2002) and
Arnold and Wooders (2005). Myopia is behaviorally quite realistic in this context–even with
small numbers of players, the calculations required of a far-sighted player quickly become
unreasonable. Moreover, as we will see in later sections, the cognitive capacity constraint
binds even more heavily when a network constraint is considered.9
The outcome of a myopic Nash equilibrium of this dynamic game is a partition of the
an appropriately simple starting point for dynamic analysis–to the extent that inter-coalition externalities
muddy behavior, they are best left to future extensions.
8The single-peak assumption is useful because individual and social preferences are aligned (the individ-
uals all want to be in groups of size g∗, and social welfare is highest when this occurs) and as I will show, the
equilibrium reached is suboptimal, despite this alignment. This assumption is violated if there are several
group sizes that are local maxima–for example a 4th order polynomial will sometimes have two peaks in the
positive range (eg: −x4 + 15x3− 74x2 + 132x− 38) . However, it is relatively easy to extend the results here
to functions with two or even more peaks, so long as the function does not become too noisy. You simply
think of each peak as an individual single-peak function.
9Note that it is possible to relax the myopia assumption. In particular, if players discount the future,
there exists a discount rate, δ ∈ (0, 1), such that the main result of this section (Theorem 2) still holds. This
discounting could represent either a traditional discounting of future payoffs, or the cognitive limitations of
the player.
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players into groups, pi∗ = {G1...GJ} such that f (gj) ≥ f (gk + 1) ∀Gj , Gk ∈ pi∗.10 Let
ε (N, f(g), φ) denote the set of equilibrium group size vectors for the game (N, f (g) , φ).
Finally, it will be convenient to define one additional feature of the utility function:
define g¯ to be the smallest g such that f(g + 1) < f(2). Note that g¯ is the largest group
that will form before an individual forms a new group of size 2.11 Figure 1.1 illustrates an
example of g¯.
g g+11 2
g
f(g)
g*
Figure 1.1: An illustration of g¯ –the smallest g such that f(g + 1) < f(2).
1.1. Stable Group Configurations
The equilibrium coalition group partition of the dynamic group formation game must
necessarily be stable group configurations–partitions of the players into groups such that
no individual wishes to deviate unilaterally. These stable group configurations are Nash
equilibria of the static group formation game, where N players make their group mem-
bership decisions simultaneously, based on their payoff f (g). Thus, before considering the
equilibrium of the dynamic game, it is useful to consider the equilibrium of this static game.
10In other words, a group structure is an equilibrium if it is stable against unilateral, myopic deviations.
It is worth noting that this equilibrium concept differs from that used in Arnold and Wooders (2005).
They consider a “Nash Club Equilibrium” (a group structure which is stable to deviations by coalitions
of individuals within a particular group) and a “k-remainder Nash Club Equilibrium” (which is stable to
deviations when k individuals are dropped from the system). I have used the myopic Nash Equilibrium
because it is simpler. It is worth noting that I obtain dramatically different results using this equilibrium
concept than Arnold and Wooders do using the Nash Club and k-remainder Equilibria.
11If f(N) > f(2), then no one will ever find it profitable to form a new group of size 2. For convenience,
I will define g¯ = N in these cases.
6
A static group formation game is defined by (N, f (g)). Call the set of Nash equilibrium
group size vectors for this static game  (N, f (g)). This is the set of stable group configura-
tions. Theorem 1 characterizes ε (N, f(g)), and thus the set of stable group configurations.
This theorem highlights two characteristics of any stable group configuration: 1) the groups
will mostly be larger than the social optimum (at most one will be smaller) and 2) all of the
groups larger than the optimum will be approximately the same size.
Theorem 1. Let (N, f(g)) be a static group formation game with single-peaked payoff func-
tion f(g). The set of Nash Equilibria of that game, ε (N, f(g)), is the union of two sets:
1. {〈g1...gJ〉 |g¯ ≥ gj ≥ g∗ ∀j and |gj − gk| ≤ 1 ∀j, k}
2. {〈g1...gJ〉 |g1 < g∗, gj ≥ g∗ ∀j 6= 1, gj = gk ∀j, k 6= 1,
and f(gk) ≥ f(g1 + 1) ≥ f(g1) ≥ f(gk + 1)}
Proof. See Appendix.
1.2. Inefficiency of Equilibria in the Dynamic Game
One insight gained from the static game is that that there will often be multiple stable
group configurations (see Appendix for further information). This raises the question: in
a dynamic environment, which of these stable configurations will be an equilibrium? And
will any of those equilibria be socially optimal? Theorem 2 states that when players start
the game as individuals,12 a dynamic group formation game has a unique equilibrium group
size vector, γ (N, f(g)) = 〈g1...gJ〉,13 which does not depend on the order of motion, φ.
Moreover, this equilibrium is always the worst possible stable group configuration from the
standpoint of social welfare, despite the alignment between social and individual preferences
implied by single-peaked utility.
Theorem 2. Let (N, f(g), φ) be a dynamic group formation game, with f(g) single-peaked,
and pi (0) = {{1} , {2} , ..., {N}}. Then there is a unique myopic Nash equilibrium group size
vector, γ (N, f(g)) = 〈g1...gJ〉, which is not a function of the order of motion, φ. Moreover,
γ (N, f (g)) = arg minε(N,f(g))
∑
i∈I f(gi). That is, the myopic Nash Equilibrium outcome of
the dynamic game is the stable configuration that minimizes social welfare.
12Obviously the equilibrium reached will depend on the initial condition. Starting the game with the
individuals acting alone seems very natural. The results that follow are unchanged if the individuals start
the game in a grand coalition.
13Note that the mapping from partitions to group size vectors is many-to-one, and thus the mapping from
equilibrium partitions to equilibrium group size vectors will be as well.
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Proof. Let (N, f(g), φ) be an arbitrary sequential group formation game. Any equilibrium of
(N, f(g), φ) must, necessarily, be an equilibrium of the corresponding static game, (N, f(g)).
I will show that regardless of the order of motion, φ, the players will settle into the config-
uration, 〈g1...gJ〉 ∈  (N, f (g)) where groups are the largest. This configuration yields the
lowest social welfare of all possible stable configurations.
First, note that the stable configuration with the lowest possible social welfare is the
one with the smallest number of groups–N−r¯g¯ + 1 total groups, where r¯ = Nmodg¯ > 0.
14 If
f(g) is strictly increasing or decreasing, then the groups will wind up in this configuration
trivially. So suppose f(g) is unimodal. f(g) unimodal implies f(1) < f(2). Thus, regardless
of the order of motion, the first individual will always want to start a new group. Since
f(g + 1) > f(2) ∀ g < g¯, all subsequent individuals will prefer to join the existing group to
forming a new group of size 2. It is only worthwhile to create a second group of size 2 when
the existing group is size g¯. More generally, it will only be worth forming a new group of size
2 when all existing groups have reached size g¯. Thus, the final group forms when there are
N−r¯
g¯ groups of size g¯, creating a total of
N−r¯
g¯ groups of size g¯ and one smaller group. The
groups will change size in subsequent turns. However, regardless of the order of motion, no
individual will ever choose to form a group of size 1, because f (1) < f (2) < f (g¯). Thus,
the equilibrium reached is one with N−r¯g¯ + 1 groups of the largest possible size, and thus the
lowest possible social welfare. 15
1.3. An Example with Logistic Utility
This result can best be understood via an example. Consider a dynamic group formation
game with 100 players and a logistic payoff function f(g) = g(20−g). This function is single-
peaked with maximum g∗ = 10 and g¯ = 17. It is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
First, consider the possible stable group configurations. In any stable group configura-
tion, at most one coalition will be smaller than the socially optimal group size, g∗ = 10.
Moreover, all of the groups larger than the social optimum will be approximately the same
size. Using these two facts, one can show that there are 5 stable group configurations
with group size vectors 〈10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10〉, 〈11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 12〉,
〈12, 12, 12, 12, 13, 13, 13, 13〉, 〈14, 14, 14, 14, 14, 15, 15〉, and 〈16, 16, 17, 17, 17, 17〉. Note that
〈20, 20, 20, 20, 20〉 is not a stable configuration, because an individual in a group of size 20
14Or N
g¯
groups if Nmodg¯ = 0.
15Note that this result is due, in part, to the fact that the myopic Nash Equilibrium considers only
unilateral deviations. If we allow a subgroup of up to n individuals to make their membership decisions as a
group, then any equilibrium that exists will necessarily have smaller groups. However, the set of equilibria
that are stable to such coalitional deviations are largely empty (see Arnold and Wooders (2005)). More
importantly, when we move on to games with a network constraint, as in the following section, it becomes
less clear what is meant by a configuration that is stable to “coalitional deviations.” Analysis of more
complicated, network-specific coalitional equilibrium concepts are obviously venues for future work.
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gu=f(g)
g=17g*=10 182
f(g)=g(20−g)
Figure 1.2: Logistic payoff function: f (g) = g (20− g). The highest payoff in a group of size g∗ = 10.
is better off striking out as an individual. Note that only one of these stable configurations
is efficient: the one where all groups are size 10. This is, not coincidentally, the stable
configuration with the smallest possible group sizes. This will, in fact, always be the case,
regardless of the utility function.
Now, consider the dynamic group formation process. Theorem 2 indicates that there will
be a unique equilibrium, and moreover, that equilibrium will be the stable group structure
with the lowest possible social welfare–in this case, the configuration with groups of size
16 and 17. The following analysis shows how players wind up in this suboptimal group
structure.
The players start the game as individuals, so the first player to move faces a choice
between remaining as an individual and forming a group of size 2. She chooses the group of
size 2 because it gives her higher utility in the next period (Figure 1.3).
The second player to move faces a similar choice–she must decide whether to join the
existing large group to form a group of 3, or join another individual to form a second group
of 2. The group of 3 gives her higher utility, so she joins that group (Figure 1.4).
A new group only forms when f(2) ≥ f(g + 1) where g is the size of the existing large
group. The smallest such g is obviously g¯, in this case, a group of 17 (Figure 1.5).
This is true regardless of how many “large” groups (groups with more than one individual)
there are. Thus, the second group forms when there are 83 individuals and one group of 17,
9
gu=f(g)
21
Figure 1.3: The first individual to move joins another individual to form a group of size 2.
g
u=f(g)
2 31
X
Figure 1.4: The second individual to move must choose between forming a new group of size 2 or joining
the existing group of 3. She will choose the group of 3, since it gives her higher utility than the group of 2.
the third group forms when there are 69 individuals and two groups of size 17, and so on.
The last group forms when there are 15 individuals and five groups of size 17.
This sixth group is the final group that will ever form. Individuals may (and indeed, will)
move between the existing groups, but no new group will ever form, because no individual
finds it advantageous to move to a group of size 1. The individuals will stop moving when
all six groups are approximately the same size–namely, in the configuration with two groups
of size 16 and four groups of size 17: 〈16, 16, 17, 17, 17, 17〉. As predicted by Theorem 2, this
is the stable group arrangement with the lowest possible social welfare value. Note also that
at no point did we specify the order of play–thus, the players will reach the arrangement
〈16, 16, 17, 17, 17, 17〉 regardless of their order of motion.
Note that while it is tempting to ascribe this inefficient equilibrium behavior to myopia,
10
gu=f(g)
1 2 g=17 g+1=18X
Figure 1.5: A new group forms when the large group is size g¯ = 17 because the individual is better off in a
new group of size 2.
that is clearly not all that is at work. It is possible to relax the myopia assumption, and
still obtain the same result.16 Moreover, myopia cannot why individuals would join a group
that is already too large. The key to the inefficiency is that when a new member joins a
group, her action alters the payoffs of every existing member, creating an externality. When
groups are smaller than g∗, this externality is positive. However, when groups are larger
than g∗, the externality is negative–new members fail to internalize the costs they impose
on the incumbent membership. The result of this externality is groups that are much larger
than the socially optimal size.
2. Dynamic Group Formation with a Network Constraint
The model of group formation from the previous section assumes that individuals are
free to join any existing group, regardless of its current composition. In this section, I
consider the effect of social, spacial, and informational constraints on group membership
decisions and equilibrium behavior. I model these constraints as an exogenous network of
relationships between individuals. An individual cannot join any group to which she is not
connected on the network. I then consider the relationship between the structure of the
network constraint and the efficiency of the equilibrium outcomes.
16Suppose individuals are forward-looking, but discount the future. Then there exists a discount factor,
δ ∈ (0, 1), such that forward-looking actors will reach the same, suboptimal equilibrium outcome.
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2.1. Group Formation with a Network Constraint
Consider a dynamic group formation game, but now, suppose individuals have an ex-
ogenous network of connections to other people. An individual can only join a group if it
contains a person she is connected to on the network. More formally, (N, f(g), φ, C) defines
a particular dynamic group formation game with a network constraint, where C is an exoge-
nous, unchanging matrix of connections between individuals–that is, Cij = 1 if i is connected
to j on the network and 0 otherwise. In this game, an individual’s action set is restricted to
include only those groups she is connected to: Ai(t) = {G |Cij = 1 for some j ∈ G} ∪ ∅ ⊆
pi(t) ∪ ∅. 17
Note that when the network is fully connected, every player knows someone in every
group and therefore Ai(t) = pi(t) ∪ ∅. Thus, the unconstrained dynamic group formation
game, above, is a special case of the constrained game where the average degree is at a
maximum: 〈d〉 = N − 1.
I will also find it convenient to refer to the connections between groups, as well as the
connections between individuals: for a network constraint C, call two groups, Gj and Gk
connected if ∃h ∈ Gj and i ∈ Gk such that Chi = 1. That is, two groups are connected if
there are individuals in the two groups who are connected on the network, C.
2.2. The Set of Stable Configurations with a Network Constraint
As before, the equilibria of the dynamic group formation game must be stable group
configurations, which are the Nash equilibria of a static game with the same constraint. An
equilibrium of the static game with a network constraint is a partition of the players into
groups that is both feasible and individually rational. In particular, (N, f(g), C) defines a
static group formation game with a network constraint. The set of Nash equilibria of this
game,  (N, f (g) , C), are the set of stable configurations of players into groups, {G1...GJ},
such that ∀i, i ∈ Gj implies:
1. f (gj) ≥ f (gk + 1) ∀Gk ∈ {G1...GJ}
17Note that this differs significantly from the use of networks in Page and Wooders (2007), which uses a
bipartite network to illustrate the partition of individuals into groups–ie: each individual is linked to the
group to which it is a member. In this paper, the network links individuals to one another, restricting an
individual’s choice of groups.
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2. Cij = 1 for some j ∈ Gj
Recall that in the unconstrained case, all stable group configurations share two characteris-
tics: groups are nearly all as large or larger than the social optimum, and all groups larger
than the social optimum will be roughly the same size. One result of adding a network con-
straint is that the there may exist stable group structures in which groups are substantially
different sizes.
Claim 3. For a given static group formation game (N, f(g), C), there may exist a Nash
equilibrium group structure, {G1...GJ}, such that |gj − gk| > 1 for some gj , gk > g∗.
As an illustration of this claim, consider a game with 12 players on a ring. Further
suppose g∗ = 2 and g¯ = 6, so that all individuals want to be in a group of size 2, and will
never form a group larger than size 6. Figure 2.1 illustrates a stable group structure of the
static game (N, f(g), C) with uneven group sizes.
C
A
BD
Figure 2.1: An example of an equilibrium group configuration on a ring. Note that this would not be an
equilibrium on the fully-connected network because the players in group C would move to group A.
It is obvious from Figure 2.1 how the ring affects the stability of this configuration. The
individuals in group C would like to join group A, but they are unable to because they are
not connected to that group on the social network. If the network were fully connected, the
individuals in group C would like to move to group A, and the configuration would not be
stable. Note that the constraint of the ring could represent either a constraint on actions
(the players would move if they could) or information (the players would move if they knew).
It could also equally well represent an explicit constraint (a legal constraint), an implicit
constraint (a social norm), or a functional constraint (a geographic coincidence). This result
provides some insight into an empirical puzzle. Our existing models of group formation
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predict that groups will be the same size in equilibrium. However, empirically, group sizes
are clearly far from identical. This model indicates that network-type constraints may be
one factor that leads to uneven group sizes.
By exploiting the fact that any two connected individuals form a fully connected sub-
graph, I can characterize all stable configurations in a group formation game with a network
constraint.
Theorem 4. Let (N, f(g), C) be a static group formation game with single-peaked payoff
function f(g) and network constraint C. {G1...GJ} ∈ ε (N, f(g), C) if for all connected
groups, Gj and Gk, either
1. gj , gk ≥ g∗ and |gj − gk| ≤ 1
or
2. gj < g∗ ≤ gk and f(gk) ≥ f(gj + 1) ≥ f(gj) ≥ f(gk + 1)
Proof. Simply note that any pair of connected groups contains a pair of connected agents,
who form a fully connected subgraph of the original graph. The result above follows imme-
diately from Theorem 1.
2.3. Equilibrium Behavior
When the players in a group formation game face a binding network constraint,18 their
equilibrium behavior is much more complicated than it is in the unconstrained case. A simple
example (see Appendix) shows that Theorem 2 need not hold when there is a network
constraint–the set of equilibria may depend on the order of play and there will often be
multiple equilibrium group size configurations.
Consider a game with 12 players arranged in a ring, with a single-peaked payoff function,
f(g) such that g∗ = 2 and g¯ = 6. Now, consider two different orders of motion: φ1 and
φ2. For the first order of motion, suppose that the players proceed in order around the
ring–that is, φ1 = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12). Figure 2.2 shows game play leading to an
equilibrium coalition structure with two groups of size 6. A simple analysis indicates that
this is the only equilibrium configuration for this order of motion. 19
18That is, one that actually restricts their action sets.
19Because of the order of play, the individuals are always choosing between joining an existing large group,
forming a new group of two, or remaining as an individual. This choice is the same as the choice players face
in the unconstrained game with the same payoff function, and therefore, the players must reach the same
equilibrium coalition structure as they do in the unconstrained game: 〈6, 6〉.
14
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Order of Movement: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
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Figure 2.2: In this game, 12 individuals are arranged in a ring. The payoff function, f(g), has maximum
g∗ = 2 and g¯ = 6. The individuals move in order around the ring–φ1 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12–and
wind up in two groups of size 6. In fact, 〈6, 6〉 is the only equilibrium group size configuration of the game
(12, f(g), φ1). Figure 2.3 shows the same game with a different order of play.
Now consider a second game with the same number of players, network constraint, and
payoff function, but a different order of play φ2 = (2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 1, 7, 4, 10). Figure
2.3 shows one possible sequence of game play, given φ2. Because the first few players to
move are separated from the existing large groups, they are unable to impose on the groups
that have already formed, as they did in the previous example. The result is an equilibrium
coalition structure with four groups of the ideal size: 〈3, 3, 3, 3〉. Since 〈3, 3, 3, 3〉 is in
ε (N, f(g), φ2, C) but not in ε (N, f(g), φ1, C), it is clear that the order of motion does affect
the set of equilibria.
Of course, the outcome pictured in Figure 2.3 is not the only possible equilibrium of the
game with order of play φ2. Many players in this game are forced to make random choices.
Figure 2.4 shows that if some of those players make different choices, then the players will
find themselves in a different configuration–in this case, 〈4, 4, 4〉.
Note that when players move according to φ2, the equilibrium behavior produces groups
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Figure 2.3: This game is identical to the game presented in Figure 2.2 except for the order of motion:
φ2 = 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 1, 7, 4, 10. This figure shows a particular sequence of moves, which leads to groups
of the ideal size: 〈3, 3, 3, 3〉. Note that 〈3, 3, 3, 3〉 is not an equilibrium of the game presented in Figure 2.2,
proving that the set of equilibria may depend on the order of play.
closer to the socially optimal size, and thus a higher social welfare than the equilibrium out-
come in the unconstrained game. Thus, imposing the network constraint actually improves
equilibrium outcomes.
2.4. Network Structure and Efficiency
Given that equilibrium behavior on a complete network (eg: the unconstrained case)
is different than the equilibrium behavior on the ring, one natural question is how the
structure of the network constraint will affect the efficiency of the resulting equilibrium,
where by efficiency, I mean the fraction of the maximum social welfare captured by the
players: ω (〈g1...gJ〉) =
(∑
j∈〈g1...gJ 〉 gjf(gj)
Nf(g∗)
)
. In particular, I will consider the efficiency of
equilibria on a well-studied class of network structures, called Watts-Strogatz networks.20
A Watts-Strogatz network is designed to model a wide range of different types of network
structures, using only two parameters. It is constructed as follows. One starts with a
regular network of degree d–this is a network in which every individual is connected to her d2
20Watts and Strogatz (1998)
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Figure 2.4: This game is identical to that presented in Figure 2.3. Note, in particular, that the order
of play is the same: φ2 = 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 1, 7, 4, 10. However, the players have made different random
choices, leading to a different equilibrium outcome: 〈4, 4, 4〉. This shows that when players are sufficiently
constrained, there need not be a unique equilibrium coalition size configuration.
nearest neighbors on each side. Then each of the links in the regular network is rewired with
probability p. A link is rewired by disconnecting one end and reconnecting it to a different,
random node in the network.
The structure of the Watts-Strogatz network is controlled by adjusting these two pa-
rameters: d and p. The first, d, is the density of the network–the average number of links
per person–and it reflects how binding the constraint is (see Figure2.5). On one extreme is
a network where everyone is connected to everyone else–where d = N − 1. As mentioned
above, individuals on this network can join any group in the system, so a game on this
network is equivalent to the unconstrained case. On the other extreme is a network where
no one is connected to anyone else–where d = 0. In this case, the network is completely
disconnected, and nobody can join any group. This is the network constraint at its most
17
binding. The second parameter in the network is the Watts-Strogatz parameter, p ∈ (0, 1).
This parameter indicates what fraction of the links are made at random, and what fraction
remain regular (see Figure 2.6). Adjusting this parameter allows me to examine a spectrum
of different network types–when p = 0, the network is regular and approximates a spatial
network; when p = 1, the individuals are connected at random; for values of p between 0 and
1, the network has a “small world” structure, which approximates that of a social network.
A pair (d, p) describes a family of networks with similar topological characteristics.
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Figure 2.5: Four different networks with different average degree (d). Networks with lower degree represent
a more binding constraint on group membership decisions.
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Figure 2.6: Three networks with different Watts-Strogatz parameters (p). The Watts-Strogatz network
starts with a regular network, where nodes are connected to their two nearest neighbors on each side. Each
of these links is rewired at random with probability p. Thus, as p increases, the network becomes increasingly
random.
Because of the multiplicity of equilibria for a single group formation game, it is necessary
to look at the average outcome over a large number of games played on networks with the
same values of d and p.21 Players play 1000 group formation games on social networks with
the same parameters, (d, p). I report how close the equilibrium group size vector, 〈g1...gJ〉, is
21An alternative method would be to determine the distribution of outcomes combinatorially and calculate
the expected social welfare exactly. However, this method would yield results that are overly narrow, applying
only to the specific network considered. As discussed early, I would like to draw conclusions about a “class”
of networks with similar topologies, which is why I choose to average over a large number of games played
on topologically similar, but not identical, networks.
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to being optimal. In particular, I report the fraction of the maximum possible social welfare
that the players realize, in equilibrium:
ω (〈g1...gJ〉) =
(∑
j∈〈g1...gJ 〉 gjf (gj)
Nf (g∗)
)
ω = 1 indicates that the players all found themselves in groups of the idea size. Lower values
of ω indicate greater inefficiency.
Here, I present results for a game with logistic payoffs and g∗ = 10. The results are the
same for other single-peaked payoff functions.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the relationship between the density of the underlying network and
the efficiency of the resulting group structure for a random network (p = 1). Since the size of
an individual’s action set is bounded above by her degree on the network, degree reflects how
constraining the network is on individual behavior. As the degree of the network decreases,
the players extract a greater fraction of the maximum possible social welfare. The resulting
group structure is more efficient than when the players are unconstrained.
Figure 2.8 shows the effects of the Watts-Strogatz parameter on social welfare. Recall
that the Watts-Strogatz parameter, p, is the fraction of the links in the network that are
made at random. For networks of all degree, the group structure becomes less efficient as the
underlying network becomes more random. This is because the more random connections
there are, the less binding the network constraint will be for the average individual. When
only a small fraction of connections are random, the average individual will tend to know
lots of people in the same group. When connections are random, they will know individuals
in many different groups, and the constraint will have less bite.
3. Discussion and Conclusion
The equilibrium of the dynamic group formation game is interesting because it is so
clearly inefficient–groups become much larger than is socially optimal, even when all in-
dividuals agree on the optimum size. Groups become too large because of an externality
that new group members impose on existing group members. When a new member joins a
group, she alters the utility of all existing group members, creating an externality. When
the group is smaller than the social optimum, that externality is positive. However, when
19
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Figure 2.7: Efficiency, as a function of the degree of the network constraint. Individuals form more efficiently-
sized groups when constrained by a network of lower degree.
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Figure 2.8: Efficiency, as a function of the Watts-Strogatz parameter. The Watts-Strogatz parameter is a
measure the amount of order in the network. The group structure is less efficient the more random the
underlying network constraint is.
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the group is the optimal size, the externality is a negative one. The entering member is
obviously made better off by joining (otherwise, she would not join), but the rest of the
group is made worse off. The negative externality causes individuals to enter a group that
does not benefit from the extra member, which then drives groups to become too large. One
way to interpret this result is that starting a new group is more difficult than joining an
existing, larger group. Thus, there is an incentive to free ride off of early group founders.
New groups are under-provided, while existing groups become too large. New groups only
form when existing groups become so large that the relatively lower payoffs from starting a
new group become worthwhile. Only at that point will groups splinter.
I have shown that the social, spacial, and informational constraints faced by individuals
making group membership decisions will improve the efficiency of the resulting group struc-
ture. Initially, it might be surprising that restricting individuals by forcing them to choose
groups that they have a connection to would improve outcomes. However, this is consistent
with the fact that the inefficiency in the unconstrained case is due to a negative externality.
When players are constrained by social, spacial, and informational networks, they do not
always have access to established groups and are forced to form new groups, rather than
joining groups that are already too large. In other words, the network constraint limits the
players’ choice sets, which forces them to internalize the start up costs of creating a new
group, limiting their ability to impose a negative externality on others.
There is a clear relationship between the structure of the network constraint and the
equilibrium group structure. The players form into more efficient groups when they are
constrained by networks that have lower density (lower average degree, d) and are more
ordered and less random (smaller fraction of random links, p). Both of these aspects of
network topology affect how binding the network constraint is. A network with lower average
degree means that individuals on the network will be connected to fewer groups on average,
restricting their action set and making the network constraint more binding. Similarly, when
there are few random connections in the network, the average individual will have access
to fewer distinct groups, making the network constraint bind. This suggests that group
structures will be more efficient when group membership requires a stronger relationship
(implying a network of lower density). Moreover, given that social networks have more
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random links than spacial networks, we would expect groups to be closer to the ideal size
when group membership is constrained by geography, rather than social connections.
4. Appendix:
4.1. Proof of the Static Game Equilibrium
Theorem 1 is built up from three lemmas. The first lemma states that in any static
equilibrium, at most one group will be smaller than the socially optimal size. The second
lemma states that all groups larger than the optimum will be the same size, up to integer
constraints. The third lemma pins down the size of any group smaller than the optimum.
Lemma 5. Let (N, f(g)) be a static group formation game with f(g) single-peaked. Then ∃
no equilibrium 〈g1...gJ〉 ∈ ε (N, f(g)) such that gi ≤ gj < g∗, i 6= j. That is, in equilibrium
at most one group will be smaller than the social optimum.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose ∃ 〈g1...gJ〉 ∈ ε (N, f(g)) such that g1 ≤ g2 < g∗.
f(.) is strictly increasing in that range, so f(g1) < f(g2 + 1). But then players in group 1
have an incentive to move to group 2, so 〈g1...gJ〉 cannot be an equilibrium
Lemma 5 implies that in characterizing ε (N, f(g)), we need consider only two cases:
either all of the groups are larger than the socially optimal size (g1...gk ≥ g), or exactly one
group is small (g1 < g∗and g2...gk ≥ g∗). The following two Lemmas address the sizes of
the groups in these two different cases. Lemma 6 shows that in any equilibrium where all
groups are larger than the social optimum, the groups must be approximately the same size.
Lemma 7 sets a more restrictive condition in the case where one group is smaller than the
social optimum.
Lemma 6. Let (N, f(g)) be a static group formation game with f(g) single-peaked. Then
for all 〈g1...gJ〉 ∈ ε (N, f(g)), |gi − gj | ≤ 1 ∀gi, gj ≥ g∗. That is, in equilibrium, all groups
larger than the social optimum must be the same size, up to integer constraints.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose ∃ 〈g1...gJ〉 ∈ ε (N, f(g)) such that g1 > g2 ≥ g∗ and
g1 − g2 > 1. f(.) is strictly decreasing in this range, so f(g1) < f(g2 + 1) But then players
in group 1 have an incentive to move to group 2, so 〈g1...gJ〉 cannot be an equilibrium.
Note that this result extends a result in Nitzen (1991) to the case of single-peaked utility.
Arnold and Wooders (2005) prove a similar result for a sequential game. The following
lemma extends that result to the case where one group is smaller than the social optimum.
The Nash Equilibrium requires a slightly stronger restriction on the size of the groups.
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Lemma 7. Let (N, f(g)) be a static group formation game with f(g) single-peaked. Then
for all 〈g1...gJ〉 ∈ ε (N, f(g)) such that g1 < g∗22, both of the following must be true:
1. f(gj) ≥ f(g1 + 1) ≥ f(g1) ≥ f(gj + 1) ∀ j > 1
2. gj = gk ∀ j, k 6= 1
Proof. Let 〈g1...gJ〉 ∈ ε (N, f(g))such that g1 < g∗.
Part 1: Consider group 1 (the small coalition) and an arbitrary group j, such that gj ≥ g∗
Note that f(g1) < f(g1 + 1) and f(gj) > f(gj + 1). If f(g1) < f(gj + 1), then players in
group 1 would move to group k. Similarly, if f(gj) < f(g1 + 1), then players in group k
would move to group 1. Together, these three inequalities imply f(gj) ≥ f(g1 +1) ≥ f(g1) ≥
f(gj + 1) ∀ j > 1
Part 2: consider two arbitrary groups, j and k, such that gk ≥ gj ≥ g∗. Lemma 6
indicates that gk−gj ≤ 1. Towards a contradiction, suppose gk−gj = 1, so that gk = gj +1.
By Part 1, f(gj +1) ≤ f(g1). Since we assumed gk = gj +1, this implies that f(gk) ≤ f(g1).
But since f(g1) < f(g1 + 1) to the left of the optimum, f(gk) < f(g1 + 1), meaning that
players in group j would move to group k. Thus, it must be that gj = gk exactly.
Together, the restrictions imposed by these three lemmas form the basis of Theorem 1.
4.2. Proof of multiple stable configurations
Theorem 8 puts a lower bound on the number of equilibria in the set ε (N, f(g)), showing
that there the static game has multiple equilibria, meaning that there will be multiple stable
group configurations.
Theorem 8. Let (N, f(g)) be a static group formation game. Then |ε (N, f(g))| ≥ Ng∗ −
N
g¯ − 1.
Proof. I will set the lower bound by enumerating the equilibria in which all groups are larger
than the social optimum (ie: the first set in Theorem 1). Note that since all groups are
approximately the same size, each equilibrium with all large groups is entirely characterized
by the number of groups. The largest possible group is g¯ and the smallest possible group
is g∗. Thus, there should be one equilibrium for each integer in the interval
[
N
g¯ ,
N
g∗
]
,23 or
N
g∗ − Ng¯ − 1.
Since the lower bound in Theorem 8 is usually greater than 1, the static game will usually
have multiple equilibria.
22By Lemma 5, this implies gl ≥ g∗∀l 6= k
23This is actually also a lower bound on the number of equilibria with all large groups. There could be
more, depending on whether g∗ and g¯ divide N evenly, but including that complication only adds more
equilibria, keeping the lower bound accurate (albeit a bit lower than is strictly necessary).
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